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COMPULSORY
MEDICAL TREATMENT-
A Moral Evaluation
ROBERT H. SPRINGER, S.J.*
S EVERAL RECENT CASES have, in effect compelled parents to permit
medical treatment of their minor children for the correction of physi-
cal deformity not involving the risk of death.' It has also been held that a
minor should have psychiatric treatment when his behavior indicated that
he was "suffering from some emotional instability."'2 In none of these
cases, however, were religious beliefs clearly the basis of parental refusal.
The developments in the law involved in these decisions raise intriguing
ethical issues which are the subject of this study.3 Should our moral reac-
tion be one of displeasure or approval at the sight of the state's overruling
parental authority in cases where not life itself but physical health and
emotional balance are the values at stake? We shall first consider the moral
values pertinent to the general trend of law herein contained, then con-
clude with an opinion as to whether the courts have overstepped moral
bounds in these decisions.
To evaluate this trend in the law, we should contrast the present con-
figuration of the problem with its earlier form. The prior position of the
law, from which this trend has developed, was that medical treatment
might not be denied a minor child in danger of death. The classic case was
that of Jehovah Witness parents of a child who would die unless a blood
transfusion were administered. The courts authorized the hospital to
give the transfusion notwithstanding the objection of the parents. Moral
opinion holds that public authority would exceed its competence in forcing
an adult to accept a transfusion for himself. This would be a gross abuse
* A.B., Georgetown University; Ph.L., Woodstock College; S.T.D. Gregorian Uni-
versity. Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Fordham University.
I See In re Seiferth, 127 N.Y.S.2d 63 (Child. Ct. 1954), rev'd on other grounds, 285
App. Div. 221, 137 N.Y.S.2d 35 (4th Dep't), rev'd, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820
(1955); In the Matter of Rotkowitz, 175 Misc. 948, 25 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Child. Ct.
1941).
2 In re Carstairs, 115 N.Y.S.2d 314 (Child. Ct. 1952).
3 See 8 CATHOLIC LAWYER 155 (1962) for a detailed discussion of the legal evolution
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of personal inviolability. But in ordering
medical intervention on a child to save its
life, the state is within its rights. No matter
what the beliefs of the parents, the certain
right to life of the child is controlling.4
To take up the ethical issues in the later
deeper penetration of the family domain by
the courts, we should first ask what are the
limits on state intervention. We suppose as
established in moral science and recognized
in our law the authority of the state in what
pertains to the public welfare, as well as the
prior rights of parents over their children.
The question is to be answered principally
in terms of what are the rights of the child.
Rights are grounded in the person.
A Moral Norm
What kind of a person is a minor? What-
ever his status in law as a person (considera-
tions of the common welfare justify limita-
tions on his personal freedom), in reality he
is no less a person than his parents, sub-
stantially speaking. He is possessed of body
and soul with all the powers of both. He has
freedom of choice once he reaches the use
of reason. He, too, has as his destiny his
personal well-being within the spiritual com-
munity of God and men, both here and
hereafter. The parents, then, are not the
fashioners of his destiny. Nor do they de-
termine his rights to the means of achieving
that destiny.
He is, however, an immature person. He
is in dire need of social assistance for his
physical, psychological, intellectual and
moral growth. Human experience and both
law and morals teach that the parents have
and aspects of this problem.
4 The moral view of earlier form of the problem
has been ably presented in Ford, The Refusal of
Blood Transfusions by Jehovah's Witnesses, 22
LINACRE Q. 3-10, 41-50 (1955).
the prior right and indispensable duty of
ministering to his tender wants. The imme-
diate matrix of his nurture, then, is the
family. But human experience likewise as-
sures us that there are parents who are in-
capable of supplying these needs, or who
are ignorant of their true nature, or finally
who know and can but will not fulfill them.
Accordingly it is the child that determines
morally his right to nurture, that is, his
needs as a person are a basis of the ethical
right and duty of helping him to personal
maturity.
Further, his needs are determined by the
social context in which he exists. His im-
maturity demands fulfillment commensurate
with the social progress of the culture in
which he lives and works toward his destiny.
He has a right to that kind and degree of
human perfection in the world today which
his family aided by society can reasonably
provide him.
As for the role of government, it main-
tains the necessary external structure of law
and order in the external community, which
exists for the good of the person in society.
It does not do what the family and other
private associations can and will do for the
person in his private or social existence.
Rather it has a supplementary function to
perform. When these other units of society
cannot or will not do what the good of all
demands, government must prod them to
the doing. When persuasion fails, and the
value to the public welfare requires it, the
moral force of law may be exercised to as-
sure compliance.
With this philosophical background, we
are in a position to elaborate a moral norm
for state intervention. A clear formulation
is the following: "It also belongs to the State
to protect the rights of the child itself when
the parents are found wanting . . . whether
by default, incapacity or misconduct .... ,,5
It cannot be objected that in so acting
the state substitutes itself for the family. It
simply supplies a deficiency existing con-
trary to the right of the child which parental
inability or neglect fails to provide for. The
state remains true to its supplementary
function.
This intervention, however, should be in-
frequent, by way of exception rather than
the rule. Or another way of expressing this
restriction - the courts should not intervene
except in flagrant instances of parental ne-
glect. The jurisprudential rule is morally
sound which holds that law must not attempt
to repress all evil but only graver violations.
Nor should it strive for some maximum of
public health. Rather it must be content with
a respectable mean. We may amend our
moral norm to read: the state may intervene
when the parents are found gravely wanting
by default, incapacity or misconduct.
But the frequency and extent of state in-
terposition is relative. It will vary with the
greater or lesser need of society at different
historical moments. Today we are experi-
encing a weakening of family life. Divorce,
desertion, the failure of love and of the exer-
cise of authority in the home constitute the
parental delinquency to which sociology,
child psychology and the courts themselves
bear witness. In general, then, this trend to
extend the exercise of public authority is
called for.
Applications
What about this extension specifically
into the area of physical health? We apply
the norm: when the parents are found
gravely wanting. And the gravity of parental
5 Pius XI, Christian Education of Youth (1929),
FIVE GREAT ENCYCLICALS 49 (1939).
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neglect of bodily health is to be measured
not by the standards of child welfare valid
for earlier times. Corrective surgery for a
deformed limb was a hazardous business
and held out little hope of success before
the advent of bone grafting and the other
techniques of modem surgery. There was no
obligation to undergo it. Today we benefit
not only by the great progress of medical
science but by the mass marketing of the
newest drugs and public health programs.
With this social and medical progress, the
right of the child to health and happiness
and the corresponding duty of the parents to
provide the ordinary means thereto keep
pace. That the courts have seen fit to enforce
this increased responsibility is an exercise
of enlightened public responsibility.
Psychological defects can be as detri-
mental to the person and human happiness
as physical ones, and more so. Man esteems
the enjoyment of his mental faculties of
mind and will more than his bodily ones.
For the courts to ignore parental neglect of
the psychological health of the child but
insist on compliance with his right to physi-
cal health would argue inconsistency, un-
reasonableness in law. Indeed both physical
and psychological elements are sometimes
found in the same illness, as psychosomatic
medicine attests. From the ethical viewpoint,
then, the development in law under study
represents a laudable and necessary effort to
keep pace with the changing circumstances
of human living.
There is, however, a greater restriction to
court intervention in the matter of psycho-
logical health than in that of bodily well
being. Psychological medicine is of far more
recent origin. The efficacy of many of its
therapeutic techniques is disputed among
the psychologists themselves. Hence there is
less hope of alleviation of mental distress.
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Moreover, the availabilty of its services is
more restricted, its expense more dear.
Hope of success, availability and expense all
enter into the moral evaluation of what are
called the ordinary means of preserving
health. To such means alone a moral obliga-
tion attaches. Anything more is an extra-
ordinary means, beyond any moral impera-
tive. The courts should not ignore this con-
sideration, lest they impose unreasonable
burdens.
Thus far we have considered the general
ethical values pertinent to the question under
discussion. With these values in mind we
should answer our final question. Did the
courts overstep moral bounds in the three
New York cases?6 Here the moralist is on
uncertain ground. He leaves the surer terrain
of ethical principle to enter the arena of the
particular and the contingent. He can only
express an opinion, not pass final judgment.
Conclusion
We can go along with the reasoning in the
Rotkowitz decision justifying a court order
for surgery to correct leg deformity from
poliomyelitis. It is in accord with our norm.
The one dissenting parent appears gravely
negligent. But the court went too far in the
Carstairs case in ordering a psychiatric ex-
amination for the child suffering some emo-
tional instability. All things considered, this
was hardly an ordinary means to emotional
health. The parent had done no moral
wrong. Given the uncertainty of successful
psychiatric treatment, she can scarcely be
accused of the serious default necessary for
court intervention to be justified. In the
Seiferth case,7 not only parental objection
was respected but that of the twelve-year
old minor himself. Ethics would side with
the majority view of the court, seeing in the
Appellate Division holding an invasion of
the person of the subject. The final answers
must come from the men of the law with a
knowledge of all the pertinent facts, assisted
by expert medical and psychological testi-
mony, and in the light of the moral values
expressed above.
6 See notes 1 and 2 supra. 7 See note I supra.
